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Triennial Review Part III: Another Unfunded Mandate The FCC claims that state commissions have a better understanding of local markets than the FCC, logic that conveniently justifies pass-the-buck policies.
The Federal government likes to make impressive sounding policies but not pay for them. (All politicians, Rebpulican and Democrat, are guilty of this.) So-called unfunded manadates force states to pay foror fail to implementprograms that the government cannot afford. In its triennial review, the FCC adopts this familar pass-the-buck mentality. Working together So far, it appears that the TRIP task force has not heard from any CLECs, but its website does feature an inflammatory speech from Judy Walsh, senior vice president for state regulatory policy for SBC (available in full here [.pdf]), in which she tells the task force that it has a unique opportunity to end UNE-P. She says:
The states are already under pressure from the ILECs, and they've barely started doing what the triennial review requires of them. The triennial review requires the states to do a number of studies to see if current line-sharing policies are to have a chance of being retainedsome within 90 days, some within 9 months. According to our reading (and with the assistance of documents from the TRIP task force and other experts): Within 90 days, the state utility commissions must:
Within 9 months, the state utility commissions must:
Analyses are supposed to consider all intermodal alternatives, which, the FCC says, "include, for example, traditional or new cable plant, wireless technologies (satellite, mobile, or fixed), power line (electric grid) technologies, or other technologies not rooted in telephone networks." That's a lot to look at. Other studies may be required as well. As one industry lawyer told us (asking not to be named), "even a 500 page document with 3000 footnotes can contain ambiguities. In some places, people are reading it and saying, 'okay, so what happens next?'" We made the call Instead, the PSC says [.pdf], "our staff made inquiries of Florida's largest ILECs." That is, the PSC called the state's three ILECs (Sprint, Verizon, and Bell South) and asked them what should be done. The ILECs said, not surprisingly, that the PSC should allow them to not share DS-1 switches. The PSC says, "As suspected, very few DS-1 loops with ULS combinations are being provided in Florida. Verizon and Sprint indicated that they have provisioned no such UNE combinations in their service territories. BellSouth has informed us that they are providing around 70 combinations of high-capacity loops with unbundled local switching to 6 CLECs in Florida. To put the BellSouth data in perspective, BellSouth provides over 7,000 DSI unbundled loops in Florida to 27 CLECs. Based on the very limited demand that exists for the combination of DS-1 loops with unbundled local switching, we believe that CLECs are not impaired absent access to unbundled local switching for business customers served via high-capacity loops, as presumed by the FCC." Unfortunately, this study, which consisted of three phone calls, did not even consider the possibility that ILECs have prevented CLECs from purchasing unbundled DS-1 switching. But there's not much the PSC can do. They've been asked to do too much. You get the government you pay for Even the FCC, which has an annual budget of about $200 million, is only asked to review competition every two years, and the 1996 Act every three years. The FCC took six months just to write up the details of its latest decision. It is unreasonable to ask the PSCs to undertake a detailed review which, due the fractal nature of the undertaking ("fractal" means the closer you look the more complicated it gets, so you can spend as much time looking at a single city as you could spend getting an overview of the whole nation), will take as much time as the FCC's broad, generalist, and inadequate review of the state of competition nationwide. State PSC budgets are far less than $200 million. The Maryland PSC publishes a detailed breakdown of its budget here. The telecommunications division, consisting of 8 people with an annual budget of $579,262 will have to perform all the tasks required by the FCC, with assistance from legal staff and the hearing division ($688,702, 10 people). The entire PSC, which handles all utility regulation (including phone, water, and power), has an annual budget of $12,684,981 and a staff of 142. The Montana PSC has a budget of only $2,656,348 and a staff of 39 (two of whom are the IT staff). The state has a small population, but a very large geographic area. The Florida PSC, one of the largest in the nation, has a budget of $27,300,573 for fiscal year 2003-2004 to oversee a state whose water and power needs are particularly complex. The FCC claims to believe that it has set up a system to obtain a very "granular" review of the state of competition in the US, but the fact that the FCC is calling on the states to do something it could not do itself (see Flawed FCC Data Guarantees Flawed Policy) makes the whole set of rules seem like an elaborate passing of the buck to state governments that cannot bear the cost. Why did the FCC ask that so much be done in 90 days? Perhaps because, given their limited resources, the state commissions might have taken 9 years to complete some of the studies. The unfortunate result is that important decisions will be based on studies that are hasty, consisting of little more than a few phone calls. Uncertainty, which continues to dampen investment in telecoms, will only continue, as these decisions are challenged in court or are found to be vague and require clarification. End
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