|

Preventing Re-Monopolization:
A Call to Arms to Competitors
by Johnathan S. Marashlian
The
Helein Law Group, PC
Jonathan
S. Marashlian is the Head of the Regulatory Law Practice at The Helein Law
Group, P.C., a full-service Washington-based law firm, specializing in Telecommunications
Law. He can be reached by e-mail at: jmarashlian@helein.com.
Mr. Marashlian
is also the editor of The Helein Law Group's bi-monthly newsletter, The Front
Lines, Advancing the Cause of Competition in the Telecommunications Industry.
For more information, visit www.thefrontlines-hlg.com.
[November 20, 2001] Over the past
several months numerous multimillion-dollar fines and countless complaints have
been lodged against the Baby Bells in all regions of the nation for everything
from wholesale service performance failures and violations of pro-competitive
regulatory conditions to other blatantly anticompetitive behavior. At the same
time, more and more would be competitors have declared bankruptcy.
Yet, in the midst of it all, Baby Bells' hip pocket politicians have the effrontery
to introduce and vigorously promote something as ill conceived and anti-competitive
as the Tauzin-Dingell "Baby Bell Freedom Act." Equally frustrating,
Baby Bell applications seeking long distance authority are proceeding before
state commissions and are being routinely, if slowly, approved by the Federal
Communications Commission ("FCC" or "Commission").
Is there any hope that this nation's legislators and regulators can and will
put two-and-two together and halt what appears to be the otherwise inevitable
re-monopolization of the telecommunications industry before it's too late?
The Telecommunications Act of 1996 ("the 1996 Act") was signed into
law nearly 6 years ago by then President Clinton. At the time, the President,
Congress, pro-competitive entrepreneurs and businesses, and the consumers of
this country held high hopes that the law would usher in a new era of unbridled
competition and choice throughout the telecommunications industry. Almost from
the starting gate, however, it appeared that one contingent was intent on derailing
this goal.
The Baby BellsBellSouth, SBC Communications, Verizon and Qwestare the
brethren of the former Bell Monopoly System and, to this day, control access
to the last mile connection to the majority of the nation's telecommunications
consumers. The Baby Bells eagerly pledged to open up their local lines to competitors
in exchange for relief from restrictions on their participation in the long
distance marketplace. The Baby Bells had no fear in making this pledge because
they never intended to live up to it. Just months after the Act's passage, the
Baby Bells challenged the FCC's implementation of the pro-competitive provisions
of the 1996 Act before courts across the country. These acts alone created regulatory
uncertainty at a time when would-be competitors had the financial support to
challenge the Baby Bells for control over the last mile.
Since then, the Baby Bells have continued to frustrate competition by tying
up the pro-competitive provisions of the Act in legal and regulatory proceedings.
At the same time, competitors were pouring their financial resources into building
out networks, wrestling for interconnection with the Bells, marketing and trying
to win customers, they fought an uphill battle against the Baby Bells in court
and before regulatory bodies attempting to advance the pro-competitive provisions
of the Act. The time, effort and resources competitors invested in these latter
efforts were of course necessary because of the Baby Bells' absolute reluctance
and resistance to giving up any meaningful control over their local markets.
The stall tactics appear to have paid off for the Baby Bells. When the economic
uncertainty of the "new economy" caught up with the regulatory and
legal uncertainty that has existed in the telecommunications industry since
the passage of the 1996 Act, investors, at one time eager to invest in start-up
competitive carriers, pulled back and pulled back hard. Uncertainty has now
become abandonment. The investment community has even forsaken the likes of
such established communications industry players as AT&T, MCI WorldCom and
others.
While the stock prices of both the established and start-up competitors have
been battered, some into dust, the stock prices of the Baby Bells remain strong.
Why isn't the FCC and Congress showing concerns and planning action when the
"successful," at least arguably well-funded, new entrants, like Teligent,
Winstar, Covad, and Rhythms have now failed?
An answer, at least to some of us who work in the competitive industry have
known all along, can be found, in part, in the announcements of multi-million
dollar fines imposed on the Baby Bells for their anti-competitive conducttheir wholesale performance shortcomings, unfair marketing tactics, deliberate
sabotage of the pro-competitive conditions attached to FCC and state commission
orders approving Bell mega-mergers and the even more ironic disobedience to
the FCC orders granting SBC and Verizon entrance into the long distance markets
in several states.
Following is just a small sampling of the Baby Bells' anti-competitive rap
sheets:
"Ameritech Pays UpAmeritech set a
new record in May for a penalty fine for anti-competitive practices and unacceptable
standards of service."
Chicago Sun-TimesAugust 8, 2001
"BellSouth Pays Georgia $7.2 Million in FinesBellSouth
Corp. . . . paid $7.2 million in fines assessed by state regulators for falling
short of standards for handling competitors."
Office.comAugust 16, 2001
"SBC, Verizon Pay $5.3 Million FinesThe
nation's two largest local telephone companies . . . have paid the federal
government $5.32 million for failing to meet goals related to providing rivals
access to their network."
CNETAugust 24, 2001
"BellSouth Fined $7 MillionGeorgia
regulators Tuesday ordered BellSouth to pay $7 million in penalties for taking
too long to release phone numbers of former customers who switched to competitors."
The Augusta ChronicleSeptember 4, 2001
Many competitive carriers that rely on the Baby Bells for interconnection,
network provisioning, billing, and other services have, for years, kept their
frustrations in dealing with the Baby Bells out of the public arena out of fear
of reprisal. Recently, however, perhaps out of the realization that the Baby
Bells are not interested in developing good "working relationships"
with their wholesale customers, more and more have come forward and filed complaints,
comments, and letters with regulatory bodies detailing their horror stories
and urging investigations.
Amid allegations contained in complaints and comments filed by several small
competitive local carriers that BellSouth was engaged in a marketing campaign
aimed at disparaging competitors in order to win back customers, public service
commissions in several southern states (Georgia, Florida and Alabama) initiated
investigations into BellSouth's marketing practices. In May, the Atlanta Journal
and Constitution reported that, "BellSouth has suspended its campaign to
win back customers from local competitors amid charges that its sales staff
may not be playing fair."
These instances reflect only a fraction of the anticompetitive behavior engaged
in by the Baby Bells over the past several years. But putting them all together
raises the obvious questionshow can legislators in Washington, D.C. even
contemplate giving the Baby Bells relief from the one remaining barrier that
prevents them from extending their monopoly power in the local exchange to the
long distance marketplace? And how can state utility commissions and the FCC
consider approving Baby Bell Section 271 Applications?
And, yet, the record is clear that legislators and regulators alike are either
not paying attention to what the Baby Bells' intransigence is doing to competition
or are casting a blind eye to the abuses because they want their political coffers
filled by the well-heeled contributors. The Baby Bells have the monopoly profits
. . . their competitors are in Chapter 11.
Despite more and more reports of Bell abuses of monopoly power, it appeared
that Congress might have been close to passing legislation that would free the
Bells from the very restrictions intended by the 1996 Act to induce them to
relinquish their monopoly grip on the local exchange.
Sponsored by two congressmen long known to be patrons of the Baby Bells, House
Energy and Commerce Committee Chairman Billy Tauzin, R-La., and Ranking Democrat,
John Dingell, D-Mich., introduced HR 1542, the "Internet Freedom and Broadband
Deployment Act," in the House of Representatives in April. HR 1542 is based
on the false premise that removing the legal prohibition on the Bells' ability
to provide long distance data services in their local regions still under monopoly
control will give the Bells the financial incentive needed to deliver advanced
networks to residential, rural, and other underserved markets.
After months of impassioned public debate and costly lobbying and advertising
campaigns launched by opponents, the bill has been exposed for what it truly
isa blatant form of corporate welfare designed to help four very large
corporations.
Despite being unmasked, the bill was voted out of committee in June and currently
awaits referral to the full House. And, although support for the bill has waned
in recent months, HR 1542 could garner enough votes to pass the House if presented
for a vote.
The sad reality, however, is that the Baby Bells have not been holding their
collective breath, pinning their hopes for long distance relief on the passage
of HR 1542. At the same time the Bells had their brigade of lobbyists deployed
on the Hill, there were many platoons of Bell lawyers across the country that
were infiltrating state utility commissions and persuading locally controlled
regulators to support their Section 271 bids to enter the long distance market.
Even more disheartening is the fact that the FCC, the agency responsible for
independently reviewing state-approved 271 Applications to ensure that competition
truly exists in the local exchange marketplace has short-armed its oversight
role. Shortly after the leadership of the FCC passed to Billy Tauzin's "friend,"
Chairman Powell, a most glaring instance came to light. This instance concerned
the "new" Commission's approval of SBC's bid to provide long distance
in Kansas and Oklahoma.
Under the prior leadership of the FCC it was established that either commercial
experience or independent, third party testing was needed to demonstrate actual
compliance with Section 271's competitive checklist. Under Chairman Powell's
Commission SBC was allowed to self-certify compliance as part of the Kansas/Oklahoma
271 proceeding. Relying on the fact that either the FCC or its beleaguered competitors
would have trouble finding any "dirty tricks" tucked away in the thousands
of pages of documents that make up a 271 Application, SBC took advantage of
the Commission's leniency and certified to the Commission that it had fully
satisfied all parts of Section 271's competitive checklist. Based on SBC's self-certification,
the FCC permitted SBC to begin providing long distance services in Kansas and
Oklahoma as of March 7, 2001.
Competitors suspected foul play. However, because the FCC failed to either
require or perform an adequate examination of SBC's compliance with 271's competitive
checklist and relied on SBC's self-serving certification, these companies had
to expend valuable resources in order to shine light upon SBC's deception. Nevertheless,
as a result of the diligent efforts of several competitive carriers, in April,
SBC was forced to reveal to the FCC and the public that the Commission's approval
was based on false testimony.
What penalty has SBC been made to pay for knowingly, or at a minimum, negligently
misleading the Commission? (Knowingly made false statements to a federal agency
is a crime by the way, 18 U.S.C. 1001).
The FCC recently proposed fining SBC a paltry $2.5 million for its actions.
Compare the proposed FCC penalty to the amount of revenue generated by SBC through
its premature entrance into the long distance marketplace in Kansas and Oklahoma
and its no wonder the Baby Bells flaunt the rule of law. In fact, SBC recently
filed another Section 271 Application seeking long distance authority in two
more statesMissouri and Arkansas.
And SBC is not alone. In the course of the past several months Verizon has
been authorized by the FCC to offer long distance services in Pennsylvania and
Connecticut and has notified state utility commissions in New Hampshire, Rhode
Island, and Vermont that it intends to pursue long distance in those states,
as well. Likewise, just over one year after it was required to divest its long
distance business in the 14-state local exchange region formerly served by US
WEST, Qwest announced that it intends to file its first 271 Application with
the FCC by the end of this year and plans to re-enter the long distance market
in all of the states it was forced to vacate by as early as 2002.
Ultimately, whether it is through the back door by means of HR 1542, or the
front door via the 271 process that has, thus far, been held wide open by state
commissions and the FCC, the Baby Bells appear poised to break into the long
distance marketplace long before real and effective competition in their local
markets has taken hold. By casting a blind eye to the monopoly abuses of these
behemoths and ignoring the plain fact that they will say and do anything to
provide long distance without first living up to their end of the bargain, the
responsibility for the otherwise inevitable re-monopolization of the telecommunications
industry lies squarely in the laps of this nation's legislators and regulators.
End
|